This paper examines the implications for equilibrium determinacy of forward-looking monetary policy rules in a Neo-Wicksellian model that incorporates real balance effects. We show that in closed economies the presence of small, empirically plausible real balance effects significantly restricts the ability of the Taylor principle to prevent indeterminacy of the rational expectations equilibrium. This problem is further exacerbated in open economies, particulary if the monetary policy rule reacts to consumerprice, rather than domestic-price, inflation. These findings still hold even when output and the real exchange rate are introduced into the policy rule, thereby suggesting that the widespread neglect of real balance effects in the literature is ill-advised.
Introduction
The importance of forward-looking monetary policy has long been emphasized by researchers.
The need to conduct monetary policy in a forward-looking, or preemptive manner, arises primarily because of the widely documented long and variable time lag after which a monetary policy action takes effect in the economy (Friedman, 1968) . But it has also been theoretically rationalized on the grounds of central bank credibility, in order to anchor and manage private-sector expectations (see, e.g., Svensson, 1997; Batini and Haldane, 1999) .
Such benefits have not been overlooked by policymakers. Empirical evidence suggests that many central banks set the nominal interest rate in response to expected future inflation (see, e.g., Clarida et al., 1998 Clarida et al., , 2000 Orphanides, 2001 Orphanides, , 2004 Mihailov, 2006) . Indeed the popularity of conducting monetary policy in this way is such that now "forward-looking inflation targeting has become a defining characteristic of monetary policymaking worldwide" (Huang et al., 2009, p.409) .
A key issue in the design of such forward-looking monetary policy then, when operationalized via simple feedback rules, is that the particular interest-rate feedback rule adopted by a central bank should ensure a determinate equilibrium. 1 That is, monetary policy should be designed to avoid generating real indeterminacy which can destabilize the economy through the emergence of sunspot equilibria and self-fulfilling expectations that result in large reductions in the welfare of the economy. 2 It has been well established in the New Keynesian (or Neo-Wickesllian) literature that under the Taylor principle, i.e. a policy that adjusts the nominal interest rate by proportionally more than the increase in inflation, a central bank can easily prevent the emergence of indeterminacy, provided it is not overly aggressive in its response to expected future inflation; or alternatively, by also including contemporaneous output into the feedback rule (see, e.g., Bernanke and Woodford, 1997;
Clarida et al., 2000; Woodford, 2003) . Recent studies have considered whether such policies are also consistent with equilibrium determinacy in open economies. 3 Among other things, 1 We focus on simple feedback rules and not on optimal targeting rules. For a discussion on the benefits of considering simple feedback rules see, e.g., Taylor (1993) , Batini and Haldane (1999) , Woodford (2001) , Svensson (2003) . For a study of optimal targeting rules in a two-country model of a similar kind to ours, see, e.g., Benigno and Benigno (2006) . 2 By real indeterminacy we mean that there exists a continuum of equilibrium paths, starting from the same initial conditions, which converge to the steady state. Our attention rests solely with the consideration of local (real) determinacy as opposed to global determinacy. For further discussion of these issues see Clarida et al. (2000) , Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) , Benhabib et al. (2002) , Woodford (2003) , Cochrane (2011) . 3 See, e.g., Zanna (2003) , Batini et al. (2004) , De Fiore and Liu (2005), Linnemann and Schabert (2006) , changes in the nominal interest rate result in changes in the demand for money, which affects the output and pricing decisions of firms, via changes in the real marginal cost of production. 8 The analysis examines whether empirically realistic real balance effects can have important implications for determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium in both closed and open economies. We begin by showing that, for closed economies, the presence of real balance effects significantly increases the severity of indeterminacy under the Taylor principle. This is first demonstrated for interest rate feedback rules that set the nominal interest rate in response solely to expected future inflation, and then shown to be robust when future, or contemporaneous, output is also incorporated into the feedback rule.
Next, we investigate the determinacy implications of real balance effects for open economies, where the feedback rule can respond to either domestic-price or consumer-price inflation.
Consistent with the empirical studies of Clarida et al. (1998 Clarida et al. ( , 2000 , Orphanides (2004) and Mihailov (2006) , we focus our attention on a feedback rule that reacts to expected future inflation and contemporaneous output. In general we find that in the presence of real balance effects the problem of indeterminacy is more severe for open economies than closed economies. When the indicator of inflation used in the policy rule is domestic-price inflation we find that the range of indeterminacy can increase as the degree of trade openness decreases. However, by reacting to consumer-price inflation, not only does the range of indeterminacy increase sizeably, relative to domestic-price inflation feedback rules, but the range of indeterminacy is now increasing with respect to the degree of trade openness. In contrast to the existing literature (e.g. Linnemann and Schabert, 2006; McKnight, 2011a) it is further shown that reacting to movements in the real exchange rate does little to mitigate the range of indeterminacy induced.
Overall our analysis suggests two key policy implications. First, real balance effects exert a destabilizing effect on the rational expectations equilibrium when monetary policy is governed by a forward-looking interest rate rule. Since the prevention of indeterminacy is an important issue, our analysis suggests that central banks have a difficult task of neither being too cautious, nor too aggressive in changing the nominal interest rate in response to expected changes in future inflation and output. Secondly, our analysis provides further adjustment costs (in terms of real money balances). 8 In the open economy, changes in money demand have an additional effect, since changes in real marginal cost result in changes in the terms of trade, via the expenditure switching effect.
evidence that central banks should use domestic-price inflation rather than consumer-price inflation in the conduct of monetary policy. Our analysis supports a number of recent studies that have argued against the current choice of the consumer-price index as the indicator of inflation used in the feedback rule. While reacting to domestic-price inflation cannot eliminate the indeterminacy problem in the presence of real balance effects, it does help to reduce its potential severity.
Our paper contributes to a small literature that has been studying the implications for equilibrium determinacy when the real balance effects of transactions services are introduced through the assumption of non-separability of the utility function (between consumption and real money balances). Among other things, Benhabib et al. (2001) show that nonseparability has no implications for determinacy using a continuous-time MIUF model.
Using a discrete-time MIUF model, Schabert and Stoltenberg (2005) find that in general the determinacy conditions are independent of the magnitude of real balance effects, and this result is robust regardless of whether prices are assumed to be flexible or sticky or monetary policy is conducted using an interest rate rule or a (constant) money growth policy rule. However, Kurozumi (2006) shows that real balance effects can be destabilizing if the policy rule responds, in addition to current inflation, also to current output. 
Model
The model is a two-country extension of the Neo-Wicksellian MIUF model employed by Woodford (2003) and Kurozumi (2006) 
Final-Goods Sector
The home final good (Z) is produced by a competitive firm that uses domestic (Z H ) and imported (Z F ) intermediate goods as inputs according to the aggregation technology index:
where z H (i) and z F (j) are the respective quantities of the domestic and imported type i and Let p H (i) and p F (j) represent the respective prices of z H (i) and z F (j) in home currency.
Cost minimization in final good production yields the aggregate demand conditions for home and foreign goods:
where the demand for individual goods is given by
Since the final good producer is competitive, its price is equal to marginal cost:
where P is the consumer price index and P H and P F are the respective price indices of home and foreign intermediate goods, all denominated in home currency
We assume that there are no costs to trade between the two countries and the law of one price holds, which implies that
where S is the nominal exchange rate. Letting Q ≡ SP * P denote the real exchange rate, under the law of one price the CPI index (5) and its foreign equivalent imply: 
Intermediate-Goods Sector
Intermediate-sector firms hire labor h to produce output given a real wage rate w t . A firm of type i has a linear production technology
and given competitive prices of labor, cost minimization yields
where mc t ≡ MCt PH,t is real marginal cost. Intermediate-sector firms set prices according to Calvo (1983) , where in each period there is a constant probability 1 − ψ that a firm will be randomly selected to adjust its price, which is drawn independently of past history. A domestic firm i, faced with changing its price at time t, has to choose p H,t (i) to maximize its expected discounted value of profits, taking as given the indexes P , P H , P F , Z and Z * :
where
and the firm's stochastic discount factor used to value random date t+s payoffs is β s X t,t+s = [U C (C t+s , m t+s )/U C (C t , m t )](P t /P t+s ). 11 Firms that are given the opportunity to change their price, at a particular time, all behave in an identical manner. The optimization condition to the firm's maximization problem yields
The optimal price set is a mark-up ϕ ϕ−1 over a weighted average of future nominal marginal costs.
Representative Household
The representative household chooses real consumption C, domestic real money balances m ≡ M/P , and labor h to maximize expected discounted utility:
where the discount factor is 0 < β < 1, subject to the period budget constraint
The household carries M t−1 units of money and B t units of nominal bonds into period t.
Before proceeding to the goods market, the household visits the financial market where a state-contingent nominal bond B t+1 can be purchased that pays one unit of domestic currency in period t + 1 if a specific state is realized at a period t price Γ t,t+1 . During period t the household supplies labor to the intermediate-sector firms receiving real income from wages w t , nominal profits from the ownership of domestic intermediate-sector firms 11 The assumption that all firms are owned by the representative household implies that the firm's stochastic discount factor is equivalent to the household's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. 12 To facilitate comparison with the vast majority of the existing literature, we adopt the traditional convention that end-of-period real money balances enter the utility function. Assuming an alternative timingassumption on money could have important consequences for equilibrium determinacy, as discussed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) , Kurozumi (2006) , and McKnight (2011b).
Π t and a lump-sum (net) nominal transfer Υ t from the monetary authority. The household then uses these resources to purchase the final good.
The period utility function is assumed to be non-separable between consumption and real money balances but additively separable with respect to labor:
The first-order conditions from the home household's maximization problem yield:
where R t denotes the gross nominal yield on a one-period discount bond defined as R (15) Letting Γ * t,t+1 denote the price of the foreign country's state-contingent bonds then no-arbitrage implies
where (18) is the standard uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition. Equation (15), its foreign equivalent and the UIP condition (18) consequently imply
which follows from the assumption of complete asset markets, where the constant
13 As is standard, we assume that u(C, m) is concave and strictly increasing in each argument and both consumption and real money balances are normal goods. It is further assumed that v(h), the disutility of labor supply, is an increasing, convex function.
Monetary Authority
Motivated by the empirical studies of Clarida et al. (1998 Clarida et al. ( , 2000 , Orphanides (2004) and Mihailov (2006) , monetary policy is specified as a Taylor-type rule in which the nominal interest rate is a function of expected future inflation and current or expected future output.
The monetary authority can adjust the (gross) nominal interest rate in response to changes in domestic-price inflation (PPI) π H t or to changes in consumer-price inflation (CPI) π t , according to the rules:
where R and Y respectively denote the steady state nominal interest rate and steady state output, and where µ π > 0, µ y ≥ 0 and k = 0, 1.
Market Clearing and Equilibrium
Market clearing for the home intermediate-goods market requires
Total home demand must equal the supply of the final good,
and the labor market, the money market
and the bond market all clear
Definition 1 (Rational-Expectations Equilibrium): Given an initial allocation of B t0 , B P *
F,t } for all t ≥ t 0 characterized by: (i) the optimality conditions of the representative household, (15) to (17) , the budget constraint (13) is satisfied and the transversality condition holds; (ii) cost-minimization (10), and price-setting behavior of intermediate-sector firms (12) , and the aggregate version of the production function (9); (iii) the final good producer's optimality conditions, (3) and (5); (iv ) all markets clear, (21) to (24); (v ) the monetary policy rule is satisfied (20); along with the foreign counterparts for (i)-(v ) and conditions (7), (8), (18) and (19) .
Local Equilibrium Dynamics

Linearized Model
As is common in the literature, the model is log-linearized around a zero-inflation symmetric steady state. In what follows, all hatted variables denote percentage deviations from the steady state. Linearizing (15) yields the IS equation for the home country:
where σ ≡ −u c /u cc C > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, and χ ≡ mu cm /u c is the degree of non-separability between consumption and real money balances. For analytical tractability the ensuing analysis follows Kurozumi (2006) in imposing:
which as discussed in Section 3.2 below is of most empirical relevance.
Linearizing the price-setting equation (12) yields the AS equation for the home country:
where λ ≡
(1−ψ)(1−βψ) ψ > 0 is the real marginal cost elasticity of inflation and real marginal cost is given by:
after combining the linearized versions of (5), (9), (10) and (17), where ω ≡ hv hh /v h > 0 is the output elasticity of real marginal cost. Domestic output follows from the linearized versions of (3), (5), their foreign equivalents and the market clearing conditions (21) and (22):
Linearizing equation (16) yields the LM equation
where η c , η R > 0 are the income elasticity and interest rate semi-elasticity of money demand, which are defined as follows: Linearizing equations (7), (8), (18) and (19) yields expressions for the uncovered interest parity condition, the terms of trade and the consumer-price inflation differential:
where E t ∆ S t+1 ≡ E t S t+1 − S t is the expected depreciation of the home currency from t to t + 1. Note that an important consequence of assuming non-separability of the utility function is that real money balances enter the IS equation (25), the AS equation (26) and the terms of trade condition (29) .
The linearized equilibrium system is given by equations (25)- (29), their foreign equivalents and equations (30)- (32), along with linearized versions of the interest rate rule (20) :
where µ π > 0 is the inflation response coefficient, µ y ≥ 0 is the output response coefficient and k = 0, 1.
It is important to stress that in the above system there are three channels of monetary policy. Using (27) and (28) to eliminate mc t and Y t from (26) and combining this AS equation with its foreign equivalent and the terms of trade condition (31) generates the following expression for the domestic-price inflation differential (in deviations from the steady state):
There is the conventional aggregate demand channel, where a relative increase in the home country's interest rate lowers home consumption and reduces the domestic-price inflation differential, the sensitivity of which depends on the coefficient κ C . A second channel of monetary policy is the role that the demand for money plays in affecting the cost of production of intermediate-sector firms.
With real balance effects the differential demand for money enters into (34) as a negative cost-push shock. Here an increase in the relative interest rate generates a relative reduction in the demand for domestic money, which results in an increase in real marginal cost and, given the coefficient κ µ , an increase in the domestic-price inflation differential. Finally, there is a terms of trade channel, where a relative increase in the interest rate leads to an improvement in the terms of trade which has two separate effects on the domesticprice inflation differential. On the one hand an improvement in the terms of trade, via an expenditure switching effect to foreign intermediate-sector goods, reduces the domesticprice inflation differential to an extent determined by κ T ζ C , whereas on the other hand it is increased (because of real balance effects), through relative changes in real marginal cost depending on κ T ζ µ .
14 14 Clearly in a closed economy both these terms of trade effects are absent since κ T = 0 as a = 1. 
Taylor rule
Taylor rule
R : CPI Notes: The index W refers to world aggregates where
. The index R refers to the difference between home and foreign variables e.g. π
Since we are interested in obtaining analytical conditions for determinacy under both the closed and open economy dimensions of the model, it will be convenient to use the method of Aoki (1981) to split the linearized equilibrium system into two decoupled dynamic systems:
the aggregate system that captures the properties of the closed world economy and the difference system that portrays the open-economy dimension. This decomposition of the linearized model into worldwide aggregates
2 and cross-country differences 
Parameterization
It will be useful to illustrate our results using the benchmark values for the parameters specified in Table 2 . Parameter β is standard in the literature and ω is taken from Woodford Woodford (2003) argues that a low risk aversion coefficient is justified on the grounds that the intertemporal substitution elasticity of consumption is significantly higher once investment in capital and consumer durables are considered. The sensitivity analysis suggests that while lower values of σ generate different quantitative results, the qualitative conclusions are the same. 18 These values for χ satisfy Assumption 1.
openness are also chosen, which are roughly consistent with the ratio of imports to GDP of the USA (a = 0.85), UK (a = 0.7) and Canada (a = 0.6).
Determinacy Analysis for Closed Economies
This section considers the issue of local determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium for the closed economy.
Policy Response to Future Expected Inflation
We first consider the determinacy implications for an interest-rate feedback rule that responds only to expected future inflation (i.e. µ y = 0 in (33)).
Proposition 1 If the policy rule reacts only to expected future inflation, then given Assumption 1, the necessary and sufficient conditions for local equilibrium determinacy in a closed economy are:
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that with separability of the utility function (χ = 0) the bounds Γ λ(1+σω) . Hence the determinacy conditions summarized in Proposition 1 collapse to:
It is clear from (35) and (36) 
Policy Response to Output
We now consider the determinacy implications for the closed-economy dimension of the model if output is also included in the interest-rate feedback rule. Proposition 2 derives the determinacy conditions when the feedback rule responds to expected future output (i.e. k = 1 in (33)) and Proposition 3 when contemporaneous output enters the interest rate rule (i.e. k = 0 in (33)).
Policy Response to Expected Future Inflation and Expected Future Output
Proposition 2 If the policy rule reacts to expected future inflation and expected future output, then given Assumption 1, the necessary and sufficient conditions for local equilibrium determinacy in a closed economy are:
Proof. See Appendix B. 
A policy rule that also reacts to output greatly increases the range of indeterminacy under the Taylor principle. Now the lower and upper bounds on the inflation response coefficient (µ π ) given by (37) and (38) are a function of the policy response to future output (µ y ).
Using the baseline parameter values summarized in Table 2 , Figure 2 is overly aggressive in its setting of either one of these policy coefficients. Indeed for high enough values of the output response coefficient equilibrium determinacy is impossible re-gardless of the value of µ π . As Fig. 2 shows, not only is the upper bound on µ π decreasing with respect to both χ and µ y , but in the presence of real balance effects it is of such a small magnitude to render the equilibrium indeterminant. For example, with χ = 0.03 determinacy is impossible for all µ π if µ y ≥ 0.08. 
Proposition 3
If the policy rule reacts to expected future inflation and contemporaneous output, then given Assumption 1, the necessary and sufficient conditions for local equilibrium determinacy in a closed economy are:
Proof. See Appendix C.
Note that with separability of the utility function (χ = 0), the bounds Γ As before, the lower and upper bounds on the inflation response coefficient (µ π ) given in (39) and (40) In addition, the analysis suggests that the lower and upper bounds on µ π are also sensitive to the degree of price stickiness. Consequently for a given value of χ, the more flexible are prices, the lower are the regions of determinacy.
Overall, we can conclude that for closed economies, Taylor-type feedback rules that respond to expected future inflation are significantly more likely to induce indeterminacy of equilibrium in the presence of small, empirically plausible real balance effects. These conclusions are in stark contrast to feedback rules that react to contemporaneous inflation. For example, Kurozumi (2006) finds that for such policy rule specifications, real balance effects only have a destabilizing effect on the rational expectations equilibrium when current output also enters into the feedback rule. Perhaps, more importantly, our analysis also raises concerns relating to the observed monetary policy conduct of central banks: setting the nominal interest rate in response to movements in contemporaneous output and expected future inflation. By ignoring the role the demand for money plays in the monetary transmission mechanism, the previous literature has suggested that such a feedback rule is desirable in preventing indeterminacy. In stark contrast, we have shown that the implementation of such a Taylor-type rule can actually be destabilizing in the presence of real balance effects.
Determinacy Analysis for Open Economies
This section considers the issue of local determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium for the open economy. We wish to answer the following question: Do the determinacy conditions for open economies differ significantly from the conditions for closed economies in the presence of real balance effects? We restrict our focus to feedback rules that react to expected future (domestic or consumer-price) inflation and current output (k = 0 in (33)), since this has most empirical relevance.
Reacting to Domestic-Price Inflation
Let us first consider the determinacy conditions for the open economy when the feedback rule reacts to expected future domestic-price inflation. 
Proof. See Appendix D. 
Reacting to Consumer-Price Inflation
We now consider the determinacy implications when the feedback rule reacts to expected future consumer-price inflation. There is evidence to suggest that this is the 
where Γ 
Proof. See Appendix E.
In order to gain some further insight, we illustrate condition (42) using the baseline parameter values summarized in Table 2 . 
21
To get some intuition behind this result, first note that in an open economy the consumerprice inflation rate differential depends on both the rate of domestic-price inflation differential and changes in the terms of trade:
Under the Taylor principle, even when an increase in the nominal interest rate of the home country results in a relative reduction in π h t+1 − π * f t+1 , since this also results in a current improvement in the terms of trade ( T t ↓), indeterminacy is still possible provided the upward pressure on the consumer-price inflation differential generated by the adjustments in the terms of trade is sufficiently strong. As the degree of trade openness determines the weight of influence of the terms of trade on the consumer-price differential, the higher the degree of trade openness (↓ a), the more likely the consumer-price differential will increase despite a fall in the domestic-price inflation differential. In addition, our results suggest that the 20 The numerical analysis suggests that, for the baseline parameter values, the (empirically relevant) lower bound is higher in the open economy (Γ 3 3 < Γ 5 3 ) and the (empirically relevant) upper bound is lower (Γ 5 4 < Γ 3 4 ) when a = 0.85. For a higher degree of trade openness a = 0.60, the numerical analysis suggests that the lower bound on µπ is the same as in the closed economy (since Γ 5 3 < Γ 3 3 ) but the upper bound is now significantly lower (Γ 5 4 < Γ 3 4 ). 21 The sensitivity analysis further suggests that the determinacy regions shrink even more as the degree of price stickiness is reduced.
greater the degree of non-separability (↑ χ), the larger the improvement on the terms of trade ( T t ↓), thereby implying self-fulfilling inflation expectations are now more likely.
Overall, we can conclude that under a feedback rule that reacts to expected inflation and current output, the Taylor 
Responding to the Real Exchange Rate
Can the indeterminacy problem, observed when the feedback rule reacts to expected future consumer-price inflation, be mitigated by incorporating the real exchange rate into the in- Consider the following log-linearized feedback rule:
where µ q ≥ 0. 22 Rather than derive the analytical conditions for determinacy, we will simply Fig. 7 illustrates that reacting positively to the real exchange rate has a very marginal impact on the regions of (in)determinacy. 23 The numerical analysis suggests that there is only a minimal increase in the upper bound on µ π for determinacy (and no effect on the lower bound). Even when the interest rate reacts one for one to real exchange rate movements (µ q = 1), the large regions of indeterminacy robustly remain in the presence of real balance effects.
Conclusion
In the conduct of monetary policy, it is becoming increasingly popular for central banks to set the nominal interest rate in response to expected future inflation. In addition, there is empirical evidence to suggest that contemporaneous output is also included in the monetary 23 The sensitivity analysis indicates that this conclusion is robust to variations in χ or a. Table 4 presents a qualitative summary of our key results in terms of the probability of the Taylor principle inducing indeterminacy for the three forward-looking policy rule specifications we considered: a rule that reacts only to expected future inflation ( R t = µ π π t+1 ); a rule that also reacts to current output (+µ y Y t ); and a rule that also reacts to expected future output (+µ y Y t+1 ). The characterization used for indeterminacy, in descending order, is: almost sure; very likely; highly likely; likely; unlikely; highly unlikely; very unlikely; and almost never. By inspection, for all three policy rule specifications, the likelihood of indeterminacy increases when the utility function is non-separable (χ = 0.03) for both closed and open economies relative to the common separability assumption (χ = 0). 24 Furthermore, indeterminacy is also more likely for open economies if the policy rule reacts to consumer-price inflation (CPI) (and also the real exchange rate (RER)) compared to when domestic-price inflation (DPI) enters the policy rule. 24 While we do not formally outline the determinacy conditions of the open economy under a policy rule that also reacts to future expected output, the likelihood of indeterminacy is easily inferred from the closedeconomy analysis presented in Section 4.2.1. The determinacy conditions for the separability case are taken from Llosa and Tuesta (2008) .
Overall, our analysis suggests that to avoid indeterminacy central banks can neither be too cautious, nor too aggressive in adjusting the nominal interest rate in response to changes in both expected future inflation and current output. For open economies the indeterminacy problem can be even more severe. Our analysis raises some important concerns relating to the ability of central banks to avoid indeterminacy through the implementation of forwardlooking inflation feedback rules. However, it does suggest that, for open economies, it would be highly beneficial for central banks to switch from the current widespread use of consumer-price inflation as the policy inflation indicator towards domestic-price inflation.
A Proof of Proposition 1
The aggregate system summarized in Table 1 can be reduced to the following two-dimensional
, where the coefficient matrix is: 
. This completes the proof.
B Proof of Proposition 2
The aggregate system summarized in Table 1 can be reduced to the following three-dimensional system in m The three eigenvalues of A 2 are solutions to the cubic equation r 3 + a 2 r 2 + a 1 r + a 0 = 0, where
As there are no predetermined variables, determinacy requires that all the eigenvalues are outside the unit circle. Since a 0 > 0, this is the case if and only if the following Schur-Cohn criterion is satisfied: (i) 1+a 2 +a 1 +a 0 > 0, (ii) −1+a 2 −a 1 +a 0 > 0, and (iii) a 
C Proof of Proposition 3
The aggregate system summarized in Table 1 can be reduced to the following two-dimensional system in m . Determinacy again requires that the two eigenvalues are outside the unit circle. Using the Schur-Cohn criteria, the det A 3 > 1 provided µ π < Γ 
D Proof of Proposition 4
The difference system summarized in Table 1 can be reduced to the following two-dimensional system in m 
E Proof of Proposition 5
